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The purpose of this study is to determine the effect of tax avoidance, corporate governance, executive’s 
character, and firm characteristics. Secondary data for this study were collected from companies 
included in the category of 100 compasses listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in the period 2015. 
The sample used in this study as many as 54 companies. Based on the results and the conclusion of 
the research indicate: institutional ownership, independent commissioner, audit quality, executive’s 
character and leverage do influence tax avoidance. Meanwhile, audit committee and firm size does 
not affect tax avoidance.
Keywords:   corporate governance, executive’s character, corporate characteristics, tax avoidance
ABSTRAK
Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk mengetahui pengaruh tax avoidance, corporate governance, 
karakter manajemen, dan karakteristik perusahaan. Penelitian ini menggunakan data sekunder yang 
dikumpulkan dari perusahaan yang termasuk dalam kategori 100 kompas yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek 
Indonesia pada periode 2015. Sampel yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini sebanyak 54 perusahaan. 
Berdasarkan hasil dan kesimpulan dari penelitian menunjukkan: kepemilikan institusional, komisaris 
independen, kualitas audit, karakter manajemen dan leverage mempengaruhi tax avoidance. 
Sementara itu, komite audit dan ukuran perusahaan tidak mempengaruhi tax avoidance.
 
Kata Kunci:  corporate governance, karakter manajemen, karakteristik perusahaan, tax avoidance
INTRODUCTION
Tax funding for Indonesia is the largest source 
revenue aside from revenue from natural resources. 
In order to develop, country’s largest revenue 
should be optimally upgraded so that the country’s 
growth rate and development implementation can 
be improve. Thus, it is expected the compliance 
of taxpayer in carrying out its tax obligations 
voluntarily in accordance with applicable laws. 
Government’s tax collection, is not always well 
addressed by taxpayers, especially for corporate 
taxpayers. Oktagiani (2015) said that, corporate 
taxpayers try to pay taxes as low as possible with 
reduce their income or net profit, while for the 
government wants taxes as high as possible in 
order to finance the country’s development.
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The differences interests between 
government and corporate taxpayers, causing 
corporate tend to find ways to reduce the amount 
of tax payments both legally and illegally. The 
legally efforts of taxpayer deduction are called 
tax avoidance, while illegally efforts of taxpayer 
deductions are called tax evasion. Tax avoidance 
is a legally avoided tax effort that does not violate 
tax regulations by taxpayers in order to attempting 
reduce of the amount tax payable by searching for 
regulatory weaknesses (Sukartha and Swingly, 
2015). Tax avoidance is not contradicton with 
tax laws and regulations because tax avoidance 
is considered as utilize the gaps in the tax law 
(Puspitasari and Ngadiman, 2014).
Beside to required for payment of taxes, 
corporations are also required to implement 
corporate governance. Corporate governance is a 
systems that explains the relationship between the 
various participants in the company that determine 
the direction of company performance (Maharani 
and Suardana, 2014). Corporate governance are 
reflected by mechanisms, such as institutional 
ownership, the proportion of independent board 
of commissioners, audit committee and audit 
quality. Maharani and Suardana (2014) found that 
the implementation of corporate governance in 
determining the taxation policies used by corporate 
related to the payment of income tax, so the policies 
taken by the corporate’s leader itself also affect in 
tax avoidance.
Dewi and Jati (2014) mentions that, 
company’s management in generating financial 
statements usually have two character traits that is, 
risk taker and risk averse. Management that has the 
character of risk taker and risk averse will reflected 
on the size of the risk of the company’s financial 
statements. The higher the risk of a company, then 
the executive tends to be a risk taker. Conversely, 
the lower the risk of a company, the executive 
tend to be risk averse. According to Dewi and Jati 
(2014), risk taker executive usually dare to do the 
tax avoidance, while risk averse management do 
not dare to do tax avoidance.
Company’s characteristics also became 
one decisive factors in action of tax avoidance. 
Characteristics of a company is the hallmark of 
a business entity. Company characteristics are 
usually reflected by firm size and debt level (Dewi 
and Jati, 2014), while they stated that, the larger 
the size of the company then the transactions will 
be more complex. So it allows companies to take 
advantage of existing loopholes to perform tax 
avoidance measures from each transaction. While 
other company characteristics also seen from 
the level of debt (leverage). The level of debt is 
considered to affect tax avoidance, because the 
addition of the amount of debt will result in the 
emergence of interest expense to be paid by the 
company. Where the component of interest expense 
will reduce taxable profit, so the tax expenses to be 
paid by the companies will be reduced (Darmawan 
and Sukartha, 2014). 
From the description, this research entitled 
is “Corporate Governance, Executive’s Character, 
Corporate’s Characteristics and Tax Avoidance”.
LITERATURE REVIEW & HYPOTHESIS
Tax Avoidance
Tax avoidance is forms of activity that 
gives effect to tax action, whether activities are 
allowed by tax or special activities to reduce 
taxes. Tax avoidance is usually done by exploiting 
the weaknesses of tax laws that do not seem to 
violate tax laws (Lukviarman and Sandi, 2015). 
Tax avoidance is a taxpayer transaction scheme 
intended to minimize the tax expense by utilizing 
various weaknesses (loophole) of tax provisions of 
a country so that tax experts declare legal because it 
does not violate tax laws. Pupitasari and Ngadiman 
(2014) revealed that tax avoidance is deliberately 
done by the corporate in order to minimize the 
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level of tax payments and increase the corporate’s 
cash flow. In tax avoidance, there is no violation of 
the law by the corporate and the tax savings will 
be obtained with ways of regulation of actions in 
the application on taxation in such a to avoid tax 
payments not taxable at all. Based on the description 
above, it can be concluded that tax avoidance is an 
attempted made by the taxpayer to reduce the tax 
expense to be borne by exploiting the weaknesses 
of tax legislation regulations. This tax avoidance 
action is legal because it does not violate the tax 
laws and taxpayers will benefit from relatively low 
tax payments or absolutely no taxable.
Corporate Governance and Tax Avoidance
Agency theory describes the relationship 
between shareholders as principal and management 
as agents in a contract called nexus of contract 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Management is a 
party to the contract or authorized by shareholders 
to work in the interests of shareholders. Therefore, 
the management must responsible for all its work 
to shareholders.
 Rahmawati et al (2015) stated that the 
problems that occur between management and 
owners can lead to costs, where lies the importance of 
corporate governance (CG). Corporate governance 
mechanism is a tool to discipline managers to 
comply with contracts that have been agreed, so 
that the existence of good governance mechanism 
based on corporate governance principles is 
expected to reduce agency problems within the 
company which can then improve the company’s 
performance. So the company relies on corporate 
governance mechanism that serves as a supervisor 
in the company. According to Permana and 
Zulaikha (2015), corporate governance is a system 
that control and monitoring managements. The 
four variables of corporate governance mechanism 
are institutional ownership, independent board of 
commissioners, audit committee and audit quality.
Good Corporate Governance Mechanism and 
Tax Avoidance
Institusional Ownership
Puspitasari and Ngadiman (2014) define 
institutional ownership as ownership shares by 
financial institutions, such as insurance companies, 
banks, pension funds, and investment banking. 
Institutional ownership is a majority shareholding 
of a company owned by an institution or foundation 
(insurance company, bank, investment company, 
asset management, and other institutional 
ownership). With greater the institutional 
ownership, then the greater the oversight of 
external parties. The company’s management will 
implement policies to optimize the value of the 
company so that the company’s performance will 
increase. External shareholders have an incentive 
to monitor and influence management reasonably 
to protect their investment in the company. External 
shareholders reduce the opportunist behavior of 
managers, resulting in a low direct agency conflict 
between management and shareholders.
Ayu et al. (2014) have found that institutional 
ownership has no effect on tax avoidance because 
institutional owners also have an incentive to 
ensure that management makes decisions that 
maximize institutional shareholders’ welfare and 
Kristiana et al. (2014) found that institutional 
ownership had no effect on tax avoidance because 
the presence of institutional investors indicated 
that institutional pressure was on the part of the 
company’s management to conduct aggressive tax 
policies. Meanwhile, Puspitasari and Ngadiman 
(2014) research stated that institutional ownership 
affects tax avoidance because institutional owners 
have voting rights that can force managers to focus 
on economic performance and avoid opportunities 
for selfish behavior. Based on the description, the 
research hypothesis is obtained:
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H1:  Institutional ownership has negative 
effects on tax avoidance
Independent Board 
According to Lukviarman (2016) the 
independent board is a member of the commissioner 
who is not affiliated with management, other 
commissioners and controlling shareholders, 
and is free from business relationships and other 
relationships that may affect their capability to act 
independently or act solely for the benefit of the 
company National Good Corporate Governance 
Policy 2004). The independent board is responsible 
for directing various corporate activities, but is not 
responsible for managing corporate operational 
activities. The independent board is responsible for 
acting with due care or due diligence in performing 
its roles and functions within the company. It 
is expected that independent board’s role can 
improve the accountability and performance, thus 
requiring significant and substantive changes in the 
implementation of board governance within the 
company.
Ayu et al. (2014) said that the independent 
board had an effect on tax avoidance because the 
independent boards were effective in preventing 
tax evasion and Sandy et al. (2015) obtained the 
result that the proportion of independent board of 
commissioners influenced tax avoidance because 
if the greater the proportion of independent board 
of commissioners, the lower the tax avoidance 
effort. Meanwhile, the research results Kristiana et 
al. (2014) states that the proportion of independent 
board of commissioners has no effect on tax 
avoidance because the existence of an independent 
board  is not effectively  in preventing tax evasion 
measures. Based on the description, the research 
hypothesis is obtained:
H2:  Independent board has negative effects on 
tax avoidance
Audit Committee
Lukviarman (2016) mentioned that the 
current guidelines for corporate governance 
mechanism require every company that were 
registered in the capital market to have an 
audit committee. The development of the audit 
committee’s range of work becomes increasingly 
widespread including; oversight risk management, 
management system control, internal audit, and 
corporate governance compliance. The roles and 
responsibilities of the audit committee as outlined 
in the charter of the audit committee charter must 
be approved by the board of commissioners and 
reviewed regularly. Sukartha and Swingly (2015) 
stated that, since the recommendation of Corporate 
Governance at the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 
2000, the audit committee has become a common 
component in the corporate governance structure 
of public companies. In general, this committee 
serves as the supervisor of the process of preparing 
financial reports and internal supervision, 
because of Indonesia Stock Exchange requires all 
companies to form and have an audit committee 
headed by an Independent Commissioner.
The results of Kristiana et al. (2014) 
states that audit committees have an effect on tax 
avoidance because the higher the presence of audit 
committees within the company will improve 
the quality of corporate governance within the 
company, therefore by minimizing the possibility 
of tax evasion practices. However, the results 
of Sukartha and Swingly (2015) show that the 
audit committee had no effect on tax avoidance 
because the board of commissioners had a bigger 
decision-making role than the audit committee and 
Nandasari (2016) said that the audit committee had 
no effect on tax evasion due to how much external 
audit committees within the company do not affect 
tax evasion. Based on the description, the research 
hypothesis is obtained:
H3: Audit Committee has no effect on tax 
avoidance
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Audit Quality
Audit quality is one of corporate 
governance’s important element which an accurate 
form of disclosure called transparency. According 
to Annisa and Kurniasih (2012), transparency 
of shareholders can be achieved by reporting 
matterials relate to taxation on capital markets and 
shareholder meetings. Given the assumption of 
aggressive tax behavior implications, shareholders 
do not want the management to take an aggressive 
position in terms of taxes and will prevent such 
actions if know in advance. An audit quality is 
determined by a Public Accounting Firm, in which 
an accounting firm is selected by a company 
or issuer based on a recommendation from the 
audit committee to the board of commissioners 
(Lukviarman, 2016).
Ayu et al. (2014) found that audit quality had 
an effect on tax avoidance because firms audited by 
the Big Four accounting firm would be difficult to 
practice tax avoidance, Sandy et al. (2015) stated 
that audit quality had an effect on tax avoidance 
because high and low of tax avoidance variation 
was determined by audit quality. Meanwhile, 
Nandasari (2016) stated that the quality of audit 
does not affect tax avoidance because the audit 
conducted by accounting firm focused on the 
audit of financial statements  not to detected the 
presence or absence of fraud committed. Based on 
the description, the research hypothesis is obtained:
H4: Audit quality has negative effects on tax 
avoidance
Executive’s Character and Tax Avoidance
According to Budiman and Setiyono (2012), 
in order to carrying out its duties, management 
has two characters as a risk taker and risk averse. 
Management that has a risk taker character is a 
management that is more daring to take business 
decisions and usually has a strong courage to have 
income, position, welfare, and higher authority. 
Management that has risk taker character also does 
not hesitate to do debt financing. 
In contrast, risk averse character is 
management who tend less daring in taking 
business decisions hence risk averse management 
will choose lower risk (Budiman and Setiyono, 
2012). Usually management with risk averse 
has an older age, has long held office, and has a 
dependence with the company. Compared to risk 
takers, risk averse management focuses more on 
decisions that do not lead to greater risk.
Budiman and Setiyono (2012) also stated 
that corporate risk was reflected by management’s 
policy. The policy taken by management can 
be indicated whether they have risk taker or risk 
averse character. The higher the corporate risk the 
more management has the character of risk takers, 
and vice versa. Risk taker characteristics are also 
more daring to make the decision to finance the 
debt, because they feel they already have complete 
informations about the costs and benefits of the 
debt.
Ayu et al. (2014) finding obtained the 
result that management characteristics have a 
positive effect on tax avoidance because with 
risk taker characteristic, then the greater the tax 
avoidance activity, Siahaan (2015) also support 
that management characteristics have positive 
effect on tax avoidance with the ratio of 1: 1. 
On the other hand, Butje et al (2014) stated that 
management characteristic have a negative effect 
on tax avoidance because risk taker management 
will avoid tax avoidance. Based on the description, 
the research hypothesis is obtained:
H5:  The executive character has a positive 
effect on tax avoindance
Firm’s Characteristics and Tax Avoidance
Firm characteristics is the hallmark and 
signal of a business entity where the characteristics 
of the company is usually reflected by size and the 
level of debt (leverage) (Dewi and Jati, 2014).
Firm Size
Puspitasari and Ngadiman (2014) stated that 
firm size is a level that can classify firm into large 
and small in ways such as total company assets, 
stock market value, average sales rate and total 
sales. But what is often done as the determination 
of firm size is based on the total assets. The greater 
the total asset then indicates that the company has 
a possibility in a relatively long period of time. It 
also illustrates that firms are more stable and more 
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capable of generating profits than firms with small 
total assets.
According to Hendy et al. (2014) stated 
that firm size affects tax avoidance because the 
bigger the company will have more resources and 
the company will take tax avoidance action cause 
it more advantage for them. While Kristiana et al. 
(2014) found that firm size not affect tax avoidance 
because big and small firm would always be 
pursued by tax authorities (regulator) for violated 
the tax regulations, and Dewi (2016) obtained the 
result that firm size had no effect on tax evasion 
because firm size did not determine tax avoidance 
activity. Based on the description, the hypothesis is 
obtained:
H6:  Company size does not affect tax 
avoidance
Leverage
Leverage reflect the company’s level of 
debt in finance its operations. In addition, it also 
provides an overview of company capital structure 
so that show the level of risk of uncollectible debt 
(Andriyanto, 2015). Puspitasari and Ngadiman 
(2014) result showed that leverage is the use of debt 
to finance investment. Leverage also illustrates 
the relationship between total assets and share 
capital cause it showing the use of debt to increase 
earnings by Niar et al (2016). It can be concluded 
that leverage is the use of funds from external 
parties in the form of debt to finance investment 
and corporate assets. Financing through debt is 
primarily long term debt will result in interest 
expense that will affect the tax expense to be paid 
by firm. So the use of debt is considered successful 
if it will increase the revenue of the owner of the 
company because the return of this fund exceeds 
the interest to be paid, and the owner’s right, which 
means increasing owner’s equity. The positive and 
negative effects of leverage can increase based on 
the proportion of debt in a company.
Hendy et al’s (2014) found that leverage 
did not affect tax avoidance because the use of 
debt by firms could be used for tax savings by 
obtaining intensive interest expenses that would 
be a deductible of taxable income, Octagiani 
(2015) obtained that leverage has an effect on 
tax avoidance because companies with high debt 
will get tax intensive in the form of deductions 
on the interest of the loan. Meanwhile, Dewi’s 
research findings (2016) suggest that leverage has 
an effect on tax avoidance because high leverage 
rate resulted in low effective tax rate indicating tax 
evasion activity. Based on the description above 
then obtained the hypothesis:
H7:  Leverage has a positive effect on tax 
avoindance 
Based on the theoretical literature and 
hypotheses of research, it can be presented as 
follows:
Corporate Governance Mechanism: 
Institusional Ownership (X1)  
Independent Board (X2) 
Audit Comittee (X3) 
Audit Quality (X4) 
While Kristiana et al. (2014) found that firm size not affect tax avoidance becaus  big and small firm would
always be pursued by tax authorities (regul tor) for violated the tax r gulations, and Dewi (2016) obtained 
the result that firm siz had no effect on tax evasion because firm size did not determine tax avoidance 
activity. Based o  the descriptio , the hypothesis is obtained: 
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RESEARCH METHODS
Sample
This research was conducted on category 
of Kompas 100 companies in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (Bursa Efek Indonesia/BEI) in 2016, 
to know and test empirically the influence 
of independent variables, where’s: corporate 
governance, executive’s character and corporate 
characteristics to tax avoidance  as dependent 
variable. Data collection method used in this 
research is purposive sampling from audited 
financial statements and annual report of public 
companies that fall into the category of Kompas 
100 companies in 2016 which is listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (www.idx.co.id) with 





This research was conducted on category of Kompas 100 companies in Indonesia S ock Exchange (Bursa 
Efek Indonesia/BEI) in 2016, to know and test empirically the influence of independent variables, where’s: 
corporate governance, executive’s character and corporate characteristics to tax avoidance  as dependent 
variable. Data collection method used in this research is purposive sampling from audited financial 
statements and annual report of public companies that fall into the category of Kompas 100 companies in 
2016 which is listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (www.idx.co.id) with criteria in table 1 as follows: 
 
 
Tabel 1. Sample Criteria 
 
Information Observation 
Listed companies on category as Kompas 100 listed on tahun 2016 100 
Companies didn’t published annual report on observation periods ( 7 ) 
Listed companies on category as Finance/Banking Industry ( 10 ) 
Companies not using Rupiah currency on annual report  ( 10 ) 
Companies with negative income on observation periods ( 9 ) 
  Outlier ( 10 ) 





The research model used in this research is as follows: 
 
Tax Avoidance = α + β1 Institutional Ownership + β2 Independent Board + β3 Audit Committee + β4 




The following are operationalization variabels in this research:  
a) Institutional Ownership (X1) wheres: percentage of institutional share ownership of total 
outstanding shares (Ayu et al. , 2014); 
b) Independent Board (X2) wheres: percentage of the number of independent members of the 
board of commissioners to the total board of commissioners (Kristiana et al. , 2014); 
c) Audit Commitee (X3) wheres: the number of audit committee members (Nandasari, 2016); 
d) Audit Quality (X4) wheres: dummy: big 4 Accounting Firm = 1, non big 4 Accounting Firm 
= 0 (Nandasari, 2016); 
e) Executive’s Character (X5) wheres: percentage of Earning Before Interest Tax (EBIT) to 
total assets (Butje et al, 2014); 
f) Size (X6) wheres: ln. total assets (Kristiana et al., 2014); 
g) Leverage (X7) wheres: percentage of total debt to total equity (Niar et al, 2016); 
Research Model
The research model used in this research 
is as follows:
Tax Avoidance = α + β1 Institutional Own-
ership + β2 Independent Board + β3 Audit 
Committee + β4 Audit Quality  + β5 Execu-
tive’s Character + β6 Size + β7 Leverage + e
Operationalization Variabels
The following are operationalization vari-
abels in this research: 
a) Institutional Ownership (X1) wheres: per-
centage of institutional share ownership of 
total outstand ng hares (Ayu et al. , 2014);
b) Independent Board (X2) wheres: percent-
age of the number of independent members 
of the board of commissioners to the total 
board of commissioners (Kristiana et al. , 
2014);
c) Audit Commitee (X3) wheres: the number 
of audit committee members (Nandasari, 
2016);
d) Audit Quality (X4) wheres: dummy: big 4 
Accounting Firm = 1, non big 4 Accounting 
Firm = 0 (Nandasari, 2016);
e) Executive’s Character (X5) wheres: percent-
age of Earning Before Interest Tax (EBIT) to 
total assets (Butje et al, 2014);
f) Size (X6) wheres: ln. total assets (Kristiana 
et al., 2014);
g) Leverage (X7) wheres: percentage of total 
debt to total equity (Niar et al, 2016);
h) Tax Avoidance (Y) wheres: percentage of 
tax expense to income before tax (Pupitasari 
dan Ngadiman, 2014).
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RESULT & DISCUSSION
After data collection and hypothesis test-
ing, further will be explained result of empirical 
test to the data by using research model.
Descriptive Statistics Test
First, here are following of descriptive 
statistical test as seen in table 2 below:
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Descriptive Statistics Test 
 
First, here are following of descriptive statistical test as seen in table 2 below: 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistical Test (n=54) 
 
Variabels Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Institutional Ownership 0.21 0.89 0.5852 0.15243 
Independent Board 0.143 0.750 0.39244 0.123532 
Audit Committee 2 5 3.22 0.604 
Audit Quality 0 1 0.56 0.502 
Executive’s Character 0.016 0.577 0.09589 0.098830 
Size 14.811 18.335 16.32811 0.912342 
Leverage 0.108 2.737 1.10654 0.701022 
Tax Avoidance -0.797 -0.005 -0.23524 0.150615 
 
 
 From Table 2, the results of descriptive statistical analysis are following: 
 
a) Institutional ownership has a mean value of 0.5852 with a standard deviation of 0.15243 where it 
indicates a possible deviation of 0.15243 (15.24%). There is also a minimum value of institutional 
ownership of 0.21 obtained from PT. Matahari Departement Store Tbk. this indicates that there are 
not many number of shares owned by the institution within the company and the less the oversight 
being made by external parties. On the opposite, the maximum value of 0.89 is obtained from PT. 
Timah (Persero) Tbk. this shows that the number of shares in PT. Timah (Persero) Tbk. owned by 
many institution and the greater the oversight made by external parties. 
 
b) Independent board has a mean value of 0.39244, with a standard deviation of 0.123532 where it 
indicates a possible deviation of 0.123532 (12.35%). There is also a minimum value of 0.143 
generated by PT. Total Bangun Persada Tbk. this indicates that the number of independent 
commissioners held under 30%. While the maximum value of 0.750 obtained from PT. Kalbe 
Farma Tbk. this indicates that the number of independent commissioners held above 30%. 
 
c) Audit committee has a mean value of 3.22, with a standard deviation of 0.604 where the value 
indicates a possible deviation of 0.604 (60.4%). There is also a minimum value of 2 obtained from 
PT. Japfa Comfeed Indonesia Tbk. and PT. Surya Semesta Internusa Tbk. It indicates that both 
companies have only 2 audit committees. While the maximum value of 5 obtained from PT. 
Charoen Pokhpand Indonesia Tbk., PT. Timah (Persero) Tbk. and PT. Wijaya Karya Beton Tbk. 
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0.89 is obtained from PT. Timah (Persero) 
Tbk. this shows that the number of shares 
in PT. Timah (Persero) Tbk. owned by many 
institution and the greater the oversight 
made by external parties.
b) Independent board has a mean value of 
0.39244, with a standard deviation of 
0.123532 where it indicates a possible 
deviation of 0.123532 (12.35%). There is 
also a minimum value of 0.143 generated 
by PT. Total Bangun Persada Tbk. this 
indicates that the number of independent 
commissioners held under 30%. While the 
maximum value of 0.750 obtained from PT. 
Kalbe Farma Tbk. this indicates that the 
number of independent commissioners held 
above 30%.
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with a standard deviation of 0.604 where the 
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and PT. Wijaya Karya Beton Tbk. this
indicat s that the three companies have 5 
audit committee members.
d) Audi quality has a mean of 0.56, with 
a standard deviation of 0,502 where it 
indicates a possible deviation of 0.56 (56%). 
There i  also a mini um value of 0 obtained 
fro  some companies whose financial 
state ents are udited by Non Big Four 
Accounting Firm. While the m ximum value 
of 1 were obtained from companies whose 
financial statements are audited by Big Four 
Accounting Firm or Accounting Firm which 
affiliated with the Big Four.
e) Executive’s character has a mean value 
of 0.09589, with a standard deviation of 
0.098830 where it indicates a possible 
deviation of 0.098830 (9.88%). The 
minimum value of 0.016 is obtained from 
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PT. Mitra Adiperkasa Tbk. which indicates 
that the executive is risk averse in which 
the executive does not dare to take business 
risks. While the maximum value of 0.577 
produced by PT. Matahari Departement 
Store Tbk. It means that the executive is a 
risk taker where the executive is brave to 
take on business risks.
f) Size has a mean value of 16.32811, with a 
standard deviation of 0.912342 where it 
indicates a possible deviation of 0.912342 
(91.23%). The minimum value of 14.811 
obtained from PT. Nippon Indosari Corpindo 
Tbk. which shows that the total assets 
owned are less than 54 other companies and 
the maximum value of 18.335 is obtained 
from PT. Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk. this 
shows that the total assets owned is greater 
than 54 other companies.
g) Leverage has a mean value of 1.10654, with 
a standard deviation of 0.701022 where it 
indicates a possible deviation of 0.701022 
(70.1%). There is also a minimum value 
of 0.108 produced by PT. Semen Baturaja 
(Persero) Tbk. It indicates that the company 
is less dependent on debt to finance its 
operations. Conversely the maximum value 
of 2.737 obtained from PT. PP (Persero) 
Tbk. this shows that the company has a high 
degree of dependence on debt in finance its 
operations.
h) Tax avoidance has a mean value of -0.23524, 
with a standard deviation of 0.150615 where 
it indicates a possible deviation of 0.150615 
(15.06%). The minimum value of -0.797 
produced by PT. Mitra Adiperkasa Tbk. It 
indicates that the resulting EBIT is low but 
the tax expense is high. While the maximum 
value of -0.005 obtained from PT. Bumi 
Serpong Damai Tbk. this indicates that the 
resulting EBIT is high with low tax expense.
Classic Assumption Test (BLUE Test)
According to Ghozali (2016), the 
normality test aims to test whether in the 
regression model, the error or residual variable 
has a normal distribution because best regression 
model is one that has normal / near-normal data 
distribution. Based on the test results obtained, 
Asymp value, significant 0.2, means the residual 
data is normally distributed. The autocorrelation 
test shows a Durbin-Watson (DW) value of 
1.453, which is between -2 and +2, which means 
that there is no autocorrelation or no correlation 
between data in time sequence (Niki and 
Syeldila, 2015).
Other classical assumption tests include 
heteroscedasticity test showing spreading dots 
that are not patterned. This confirms that there 
is no heteroscedasticity. The multicolinearity 
test yields the conclusion that all independent 
variables are free from mulitkolinearity (have 
tolerance value> 0.10 and have variance inflation 
factor (VIF) <10,0.).
Hypotheses Test
The results of hypothesis testing are 
included in table 3 below:
 Table 3. Hypothesis Test 
 
Variable Hip Coef Sig. 
Constanta  0,027 0,950 
Institutional Ownership H1 (-) -0,313 0,04** 
Independent Board H2 (-) -0,162 0,02** 
Audit Committee H3 -0,025 0,45 
Audit Quality H4 (-) -0,074 0,02** 
Executive’s Character H5 (+) 0,120 0,08* 
Size H7 0,011 0,636 
Leverage H6 (+) 0,083 0,009** 
  R2 (R Square)                        : 0,382 
  Adj R2 (Adjusted R Square)  : 0,473 
  F hitung                                 : 2,579 
  F Signifikansi                        : 0,025 
             ** = sig.5%, * = sig. 10% 
 
Hereby the following explanation from table 6: 
 
a.) Institutional Ownership and Tax Avoidance 
Institutional ownership has a negative and significant effect on tax avoidance. This is indicated by 
negative coefficient value (-0.313) and p value value of 0.04 is smaller than 0.05. This suggests 
that with higher institutional ownership can lead managers to complied with the rules of conduct 
and minimize tax avoidance behavior. The results of this study are consistent with Nhadimal, et.al. 
(2014) but not consistent with Ayu et.al. (2014) and Kristiana, et.al. (2014). 
 
b.) Independent Board  and Tax Avoidance 
Independent board has a negative and significant effect on tax avoidance. This is indicated by 
negative coefficient value (-0.162) and p value value of 0.02 is smaller than 0.05. This shows that 
the independent board serves to supervise and control the performance of management, then its 
existence will be able to suppress dan push down the tax avoidance action. The results of this study 
support research conducted by Kristiana et al. (2014) but does not support the research results of 
Ayu et al. (2014) and Sandy et al. (2015) 
 
c.) Audit Committee and Tax Avoidance  
Audit Committee has no significant effect on tax avoidance. This is indicated by the negative 
coefficient value (-0.074) and the value of p value of 0.45 is greater than 0.05. It can be concluded 
that the audit committee has not been able to perform its duties in supervising the internal control 
structure of the company so that tax avoidance practices conducted by certain parties can not be 
detected by the audit committee. In other words, the audit committee within the company is only 
procedural because of the rules of the IDX that require all issuers to form and have an audit 
committee. These results support the research of Sukartha and Swingly (2015) and Nandasari 
(2016) and do not support the results of Kristiana et al's research. (2014). 
 
 
d.) Audit Quality and Tax Avoidance 
Audit quality has a negative and significant effect on tax avoidance. This is indicated by negative 
coefficient value (-0.074) and p value value of 0.02 is smaller than 0.05. In other words, an audit 
conducted by Big 4 Accounting Firm can lower tax avoidance activities, compared to audits 
conducted by Non Big 4 Accounting Firm because the quality of financial statement audit 
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Hereby the following explanation from 
table 6:
a.) Institutional Ownership and Tax Avoidance
 Institutional ownership has a negative and 
significant effect on tax avoidance. This 
is indicated by negative coefficient value 
(-0.313) and p value value of 0.04 is smaller 
than 0.05. This suggests that with higher 
institutional ownership can lead managers 
to complied with the rules of conduct and 
minimize tax avoidance behavior. The 
results of this study are consistent with 
Nhadimal, et.al. (2014) but not consistent 
with Ayu et.al. (2014) and Kristiana, et.al. 
(2014).
b.) Independent Board  and Tax Avoidance
 Independent board has a negative and 
significant effect on tax avoidance. This 
is indicated by negative coefficient value 
(-0.162) and p value value of 0.02 is smaller 
than 0.05. This shows that the independent 
board serves to supervise and control the 
performance of management, then its 
existence will be able to suppress dan push 
down the tax avoidance action. The results 
of this study support research conducted by 
Kristiana et al. (2014) but does not support 
the research results of Ayu et al. (2014) and 
Sandy et al. (2015)
c.) Audit Committee and Tax Avoidance 
 Audit Committee has no significant effect 
on tax avoidance. This is indicated by the 
negative coefficient value (-0.074) and the 
value of p value of 0.45 is greater than 0.05. 
It can be concluded that the audit committee 
has not been able to perform its duties in 
supervising the internal control structure 
of the company so that tax avoidance 
practices conducted by certain parties can 
not be detected by the audit committee. In 
other words, the audit committee within the 
company is only procedural because of the 
rules of the IDX that require all issuers to 
form and have an audit committee. These 
results support the research of Sukartha and 
Swingly (2015) and Nandasari (2016) and 
do not support the results of Kristiana et al’s 
research. (2014).
d.) Audit Quality and Tax Avoidance
 Audit quality has a negative and significant 
effect on tax avoidance. This is indicated 
by negative coefficient value (-0.074) and 
p value value of 0.02 is smaller than 0.05. 
In other words, an audit conducted by Big 
4 Accounting Firm can lower tax avoidance 
activities, compared to audits conducted 
by Non Big 4 Accounting Firm because 
the quality of financial statement audit 
conducted by Big 4 Accounting Firm, has 
to measure whether there is fraud taxation 
by the company, in this case the activities 
of tax avoidance . These results support the 
Nandasari (2016) study but do not support 
the results of Ayu et al. (2014) and Sandy et 
al. (2015)
e.) Executive’s Character and Tax Avoidance
 The character of executive (management) 
has a positive and significant effect on tax 
avoidance. This is indicated by the positive 
coefficient value (0.120) and the p value 
of 0.08 is smaller than 0.1. With nature of 
being risk taker, the characters can effect 
tax avoidance activities higher and one of 
them dare to want to violate the government 
regulation. Where the results support the 
research conducted et al. (2014) and Siahaan 
(2015).
f.) Size and Tax Avoidance
 Firm size has no significant effect on tax 
avoidance. This is indicated by the value 
of positive coefficient (0.011) and p value 
value of 0.636 greater than 0.05. It means 
that large companies and small companies 
will definitely get the attention from the 
Government associated with the income 
profits obtained by companies. So it is 
difficult for the company to do tax avoidance 
because anykind of companies size are taxed 
according to the prevailing rules. This result 
is in line with Kristiana et al’s research. 
(2014) and Dewi (2016) but did not support 
the results of Hendy et al. (2014).
g.) Leverage and tax avoidance
 Leverage has a positive and significant 
effect on tax avoidance. This is indicated 
by positive coefficient value (0,083) and 
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value of p value equal to 0,009 less than 
0.05. Leverage rate is proven to cause tax 
avoidance because high leverage causes 
high debt interest expense. So net income 
will drop down and produces a low tax 
expense and this is one way of tax avoidance 
practices that can be used by companies 
without violate the regulators. These results 
support the Dewi’s research (2016) but 
contrary to the results of research Hendy et 
al. (2014) and Oktagiani (2015).
LIMITATIONS
The limitations of this study are:
a.) This study uses annual report data and 
corporate financial report audit data included 
in the category of compass company 100 
taken from the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
Website (http://idx.co.id) within only the 
period of 2016, so the results of this study 
only influenced by events at that time.
b.) The corporate governance was used only 
mechanisms and only used the institutional 
ownership, independent board, audit 
committee and audit quality. While the firm 
characteristics was used only the size of the 
company and leverage.
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recommendation that can be submitted 
based on this research are as follows:
a.) For next researchers, should increase the 
amount of data because in this study only use 
the data for 1 year so can’t see the trend of tax 
avoidance in the long term. Researchers also 
need to add other variables both financial 
and non-financial, for example, financial 
variables can use variable profitability ratios 
and non-financial variables can use variable 
political connections.
b.) For investors, should not choose a company 
whose executive’s (management) character 
are risk taker because the risk taker 
management is willing to take a dangerous 
business risk for the company. Investors 
can also see the leverage because the results 
showed that the correlation variable is 
positive (+) significant, so the company can 
practice tax avoidance.
c.) For the companies, should consider 
institutional ownership, independent 
commissioners, and accounting firm size as 
proven to reduce tax avoidance measures.
d.) For Regulator (the Directorate General of 
Taxes) to pay more attention to corporate tax 
planning because of tax planning may occur 
tax avoidance activity. Tax evasion that is not 
handled properly and continuously happens 
will be able to reduce tax revenue of country.
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